

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-342

11 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee

STATINTL FROM:   
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Review of the Ability of the Armed Forces  
Courier Service (ARFCOS) to Protect Extremely  
Sensitive Material

1. Attached is a memorandum from the DIA Member who asks that each of us provide him our organizational responses to certain questions no later than 15 October 1980. STATINTL

2. DIA's point of contact for this material is  extension 52599.

3. Your expeditious response to  would be appreciated. STATINTL

STATINTL



Attachment

Army and DIA  
review(s) completed.



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

U-6388/RSS-3B

9 SEP 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Review of the Ability of the Armed Forces Courier Service  
(ARFCOS) to Protect Extremely Sensitive Material

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has been tasked by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) to conduct a study to determine the ability of the ARFCOS to protect extremely sensitive material. This study stems from recommendations made by the U.S. Army Adjutant General (AG), as executive agent for ARFCOS, in a memorandum to the Chairman, OJCS, on 29 July 1980. The basis of this review is a hijacking incident involving an ARFCOS vehicle in Italy in January 1980 and the subsequent loss of the entire ARFCOS shipment.

2. The AG memorandum to the JCS sets forth tentative findings and recommendations. Among these is the recommendation that JCS direct that a study be conducted to determine:


- a. If there is any information or material which requires protection at all costs including possible loss of life?
- b. What is and who has the authority to designate such material?
- c. What is the number, size and frequency of shipment of such material?
- d. What is the ordinary channel for transmission of such material?
- e. What criteria have been established for protecting and transporting such material?
- f. What special protection or resources are required if ARFCOS is the transmission channel for this material?

3. In order to ensure that a comprehensive review is conducted, request that those SECOM members whose agencies utilize ARFCOS provide their respective organizational response to the questions posed in paragraph 2 of this memorandum. Responses should be completed NLT 15 October 1980 and returned to DIA for inclusion in the final report to be made to the OJCS. DIA point of contact for this study is [redacted] x52599, RSS-3B.

STATINTL

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1 Enclosure a/s



Colonel, USA  
DIA Member

STATINTL



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DAAG-ZX

29 JUL 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Review of the Ability of ARFCOS to Protect Extremely Sensitive Material

1. Inclosure 1 is the report of the informal investigation into the circumstances connected with the hijacking of a vehicle transporting an ARFCOS shipment in Naples, Italy on 24 January 1980. The second and third indorsements of the report recommend a review of the ARFCOS ability to protect extremely sensitive material at virtually all costs.

2. Inclosure 2 contains a description of the material routinely transported by the ARFCOS, a discussion of the threat, an overview of ARFCOS security and alternative measures, a discussion of relevant directives and studies, tentative findings, and interim conclusions. The review is confined, for the most part, to the physical protection of courier shipments in transit. The review cannot be completed until the USIB, or appropriate executive body determines types of material requiring protection against a threat which could cost loss of life. It does find, however, that the protection provided by ARFCOS is adequate for all the identifiable material transported in the system.

3. Summary of Tentative Findings.

a. All material transported by the ARFCOS is provided adequate protection from covert, or undetected, access; security measures are in accordance with current directives and regulations governing the handling and storage of Top Secret information.

b. "SIOP-ESI" and "Two-Man Control" materials are protected as prescribed by current JCS directives; none of the documents reviewed identified material of greater sensitivity.

c. All the items transported by the ARFCOS do not qualify for the same degree of protection; approximately 50% of the material requires only routine secure storage and inventory.

d. ARFCOS personnel are neither trained nor equipped to prevent access to shipments if deadly force is used or threatened.

e. Studies on the subject of courier operations conclude that it is neither prudent nor effective to arm the courier.

DAAG-ZX

SUBJECT: Review of the Ability of ARFCOS to Protect Extremely Sensitive Material

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ments under any circumstances are too costly and inefficient to be implemented on a routine basis.

4. Recommendations:


a. JCS direct a study to determine:

- (1) if any of this material exists.
- (2) number, size and frequency of shipments.
- (3) authority to designate material as such.
- (4) appropriate channel for transmission.
- (5) resources required if ARFCOS is appropriate channel.

b. ARFCOS is available to participate in any way in this study.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR ARFCOS:

2 Incl  
as

  
J. C. PENNINGTON  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General